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Abstract
This paper studies how fi nancial innovation in sovereign debt markets can increase a 
country’s level of private investment and welfare. I propose a model where public debt has 
a liquidity purpose for the domestic private sector and is demanded as a saving vehicle by 
more patient international investors. The public bond is risky, it has a low (high) return when 
the government’s fi scal capacity is low (high), but the government cannot strategically 
default on it. The main result of the paper is that the government can increase private 
investment by increasing the number of assets supplied, tranching its fi scal capacity, and 
issuing a safe and a risky bond. The risky bond is held only by international investors 
and the domestic private sector demands the safe bonds. Safe bonds lower the cost of 
liquidity hoarding for the private sector which enables it to increase investment. I test the 
predictions of the model using a dataset on public debt and local currency sovereign debt 
ownership for a group of emerging economies. I fi nd that domestic collateral constraints 
are key determinants of the shares held abroad of total public debt and especially of 
relatively riskier debt instruments (local currency debt). 
Keywords: sovereign debt, fi nancial innovation, liquidity.
JEL classifi cation: F34, G21, G23, H63.
Resumen
Este artículo estudia cómo la innovación fi nanciera en mercados de deuda soberana puede 
aumentar el nivel de inversión privada y el bienestar de un país. Propongo un modelo donde la 
deuda pública actúa como vehículo de provisión de liquidez para el sector privado doméstico 
y es demandado también como vehículo de ahorro por inversores internacionales más 
pacientes. El bono soberano es arriesgado, tiene un retorno bajo (alto) cuando la capacidad 
fi scal del gobierno es baja (alta), pero el gobierno no puede hacer impago estratégico. El 
resultado principal del artículo es que el gobierno puede aumentar la inversión doméstica 
privada si aumenta el número de activos, y emite un activo seguro y uno arriesgado. El activo 
arriesgado solo lo demandan los inversores internacionales. El sector privado doméstico 
demanda los activos seguros ya que disminuyen el coste de aprovisionarse de liquidez lo 
que le permite aumentar la inversión. Contrasto las predicciones del modelo usando una 
base de datos sobre base inversora de deuda pública y de deuda pública en moneda local 
para un grupo de economías emergentes. Encuentro que las restricciones crediticias a 
nivel doméstico juegan un papel clave en determinar la proporción de deuda pública total 
en manos de no residentes y especialmente de instrumentos de deuda más arriesgados 
(deuda en moneda local).  
Palabras clave: deuda soberana, innovación fi nanciera, liquidez.
Códigos JEL: F34, G21, G23, H63.
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1 Introduction
The set of instruments that governments all over the world issue is large and has expanded
over time. Governments issue debt with different maturities, bonds indexed to inflation or to
some reference interest rate and some countries issue debt in different currencies. Financial
innovation has transformed sovereign debt markets of advanced and emerging economies.
This process of financial innovation is still ongoing. To give some recent examples, the United
States approved in July 2013 the issuance of Floating Rate Notes (FRNs) indexed to the
13-week US Treasury bill auction rate and the first auction of this type of securities was held
in January 2014. Spain started issuing inflation indexed bonds in June 2014.
The timing, circumstances and country characteristics of governments introducing financial
innovations in sovereign debt markets differ widely. For instance, inflation-indexed bonds are
issued by emerging economies as well as advanced economies. Some of them started issuing
them in the nineties and 2000s and others as early as the forties. Moreover there is no
systematic distinction in the timing across advanced and emerging economies (Borensztein
et al. (2004)). A big proportion of emerging markets’ borrowing is done in foreign currency
but several advanced economies also issue part of their debt in a foreign currency. See
Appendix A for some examples.
Another relevant characteristic of sovereign debt markets is that they are open to a large
variety of investors. A common distinction is made between domestic and foreign holders
of debt and within each of these whether it is the official sector, mostly Central Banks; the
financial sector or the non-financial sector. These investors might differ in their degree of
patience or in their rationale to hold public debt: as a vehicle to save, as a way to store
liquidity or as a policy tool.
This paper combines these two observations and studies how the composition of public debt
investor base, in particular local vis-a-vis foreign debt holders, can shape the government’s
financial innovations in sovereign debt markets.
I propose a model where the local private sector uses public debt to hoard liquidity for a
future and uncertain liquidity shock in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Woodford
(1990), Gennaioli et al. (2014b) or Angeletos et al. (2012). In contrast with these models,
I assume that sovereign debt markets are open to more patient risk-neutral international
investors who demand the public assets as a savings vehicle. Finally, I assume that the
government’s future fiscal capacity is uncertain which, absent financial innovation, renders
public debt risky.
The main result of the paper is that the government can increase domestic investment if
instead of issuing one bond which pays off its risky fiscal capacity in the next period, it
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Figure 1: Share of own debt holdings (as % of banking sector assets) and share of sovereign
debt held by foreign investors for emerging economies (Source: Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014))
tranches its fiscal capacity and issues two different assets. When the government is con-
strained by short-selling restrictions, the optimal asset combination is a safe and a risky
asset. The intuition for this result is that the existence of a safe asset lowers the cost of
liquidity hoarding for the private sector. This increases the equity multiplier, that is, the
extent to which the private sector can leverage its own wealth which in turn increases domes-
tic investment and welfare. The residual fiscal capacity is designed to attract risk-neutral
international investors who do not have a liquidity motive for holding debt and are willing
to hold riskier debt instruments.
The comparative statics of the model are consistent with recent changes in public debt own-
ership as a whole and differences in the investor composition for different debt instruments.
First, it is consistent with the increase in the holdings of own sovereign debt by financial
institutions in all groups of emerging economies and the drop in the share of sovereign debt
held by non-residents after the financial crisis as shown in figure 1 for several groups of
emerging economies. Arslanalp and Tsuda (2012) and Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) report
the same stylized fact for advanced economies.
Second, it is consistent with recent ownership shifts towards foreign investors of riskier debt
instruments1. Recently emerging economies have experienced a surge in the share of local
currency (LC) debt held by foreigners. Du and Schreger (2013) report that the share of
LC debt in total emerging market offshore debt trading volume has increased from 35% in
2000 to 71% in the 2011. Figure 2 plots in blue the share of LC debt held by foreigners
for years before and after the global financial crisis and in green a measure of collateral
constraints. In particular I use the amount needed as collateral for a loan as percentage of
1For the purpose of this paper, riskier sovereign debt instruments are those whose payment is cyclical,
that is, they pay more in good states of the world.
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Figure 2: Share of LC debt held abroad and collateral constraints for celected countries
(Data sources: Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) and World Bank Enterprise Surveys)
the loan amount from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. We see that the share of LC debt
held by non-residents in recent years has increased and that it is closely correlated to the
strength of collateral constraints in the domestic economy. Through the lens of the model
a tightening of collateral constraints or a fiscal capacity drop will cause an increase in the
share of domestic banks holdings of debt, decrease in the share held abroad, and increase in
the share of LC debt held by foreigners.
Empirically I find that domestic financial conditions, more so than fiscal capacity, are a
key determinant of the share of sovereign debt held abroad as well as the share of LC debt
held by nonresidents. To do this, I use a panel dataset with quarterly data on sovereign
debt ownership, measures of collateral constraints, fiscal capacity, and other controls for 21
emerging economies between 2004 and 2010.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section discusses the related liter-
ature. Section 2 introduces the model and presents the benchmark scenario with only one
public bond. Section 3 presents the benevolent government’s general financial innovation
problem. This section also proposes the combinations of assets that implement the optimal
allocation obtained in the planner’s problem. Section 4 highlights the benefits of financial
innovation in sovereign borrowing and its complementarities with financial integration. Sec-
tion 5 presents some comparative statics results when the government issues more than one
public asset. Section 6 tests empirically the comparative statics results from the benchmark
model and the model with more than one public asset. Finally section 7 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, the model I present builds
upon the models about public provision of liquidity such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),
Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) and Woodford (1990). It also relates to the models about
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optimal provision of liquidity using public debt such as Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998),
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2009) or Angeletos et al. (2012). However all the aforementioned
papers have studied the optimal quantity of debt and have assumed away default risk or any
constraints on fiscal capacity and have also ruled out multiple debt instruments. This paper,
by contrast, abstracts from the quantity of debt and focuses on the fiscal capacity dimension
and shows how the issuance of different debt instruments can improve liquidity provision for
a given quantity of debt.
Second, in the spirit of Allen and Gale (1994) I study how financial innovation can decrease
the cost of liquidity hoarding and hence increase investment. To the best of my knowledge
there has been little work about financial innovation in sovereign borrowing. Gale (1990)
studies the optimal design of public debt in an overlapping generations model and concen-
trates on risk-sharing. Papers such as Sandleris et al. (2011) and Hatchondo and Martinez
(2012) study GDP-linked bonds and their relationship with sovereign debt sustainability,
default incentives and risk-sharing benefits. However these models allow for sovereign de-
fault and consider a particular financial innovation, GDP-linked bonds, and their objective
is not to solve a general financial innovation problem for the government. This paper instead
does not allow for default and imposes commitment on the government’s side but studies a
general financial innovation framework. Also, contrary to the papers mentioned above, the
model presented in this paper features domestic debt and a liquidity purpose of public debt.
This paper also contributes to the debate about financial innovation in public debt where
there have been several proposals to make governments’ securities more state-contingency
which would improve risk-sharing between debtors and creditors. The most relevant ones
have proposed to make debt contingent on commodity prices or another external variable
relevant to the country (Caballero (2002, 2003)) or to create securities indexed to GDP
(Shiller (1993, 2003)). In the model I present here, state-contigency is advisable for another
reason: the existence of two types of investors with different motives to hold public debt,
liquidity hoarding and saving.
This paper is also related to the literature on shortage of safe assets (Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2009), Caballero and Farhi (2013), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012)). It is also closely
related to the ESBies policy proposal by Brunnermeier et al. (2011) which points at a lack
of safe assets as the source of problems in the European Union. In that paper they propose
a European Debt Agency which would buy a portfolio of member nations sovereign bonds
and issue senior and junior tranches of this portfolio. However in this paper the scope of
application is a union and requires a supranational entity. My paper instead can be applied
to a wider range of countries. I also solve the planner’s general financial innovation problem
and conclude that state-contingency can do better than safe assets. I also concentrate on
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the investor base composition of the safe as well as the risky debt instrument. Finally, the
model set-up in my paper allows me to perform comparative statics that are later brought
to the data.
Finally this paper relates to recent papers on public debt ownership such as Broner et al.
(2010), Erce (2012), Gennaioli et al. (2014b), Broner et al. (2014) and Brutti and Saure
(2013). Most have concentrated on investor base composition and default incentives, espe-
cially regarding creditor discrimination. This paper instead focuses on how investor base
composition can shape the introduction of heterogeneous debt instruments in sovereign debt
markets. I will discuss in greater detail how the model presented in this paper compares to
Broner et al. (2014) in the last section of the paper.
2 One Defaultable Bond
2.1 Set-up
We consider a three period economy with time indexed t = 0, 1, 2 and a single good. There
are three types of agents: an entrepreneur, a consumer, and a foreign investor. All agents
are risk-neutral and get utility from consumption in all three periods. The first two agents
have a discount factor of β = 1 whereas the foreign investor’s discount factor denoted by β∗,
satisfies β∗ > 1.
At date 0 the entrepreneur invests in a project of variable scale and chooses initial investment
scale I. Her initial net worth equals A. The consumer has a big endowment that can lend
to the entrepreneur. At date 1 the project is hit by a liquidity shock s which makes the
project require an injection of s units of good per unit of initial investment to continue. The
liquidity shock can take two values {sH , sL}, where sH > sL, with respective probabilities
{λ, 1 − λ}. After the project is hit by the liquidity shock the entrepreneur can decide the
continuation scale of the project i(s) ∈ [0, I]. At date 2 the project gives a private return to
the entrepreneur of R > 1 for each unit of investment that was carried through to date 2.
From this return only ρ < R is pledgeable to consumers.
The entrepreneur chooses initial investment I > A. Under R > 1 the project earns a higher
return than the market rate. Therefore the entrepreneur wants to be a net borrower and
invest more than her own wealth. At date 0 the entrepreneur borrows from consumers I −A
as well as the cost of insuring for the future liquidity shock. The foreign investor cannot
lend to the domestic entrepreneur.
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Assumption 1. International investors cannot lend directly to domestic entrepreneurs.
Only domestic consumers can do so.
This assumption is a reduced form way to capture that domestic consumers have a com-
parative advantage in lending to domestic entrepreneurs with respect to foreign investors.
Borrowing from abroad would be too costly for entrepreneurs. This might capture domestic
consumers having better information about the entrepreneur’s project or the domestic con-
ditions in which the entrepreneur’s project is carried out, better monitoring capacity or a
stronger protection by domestic bankruptcy laws.
Admittedly this assumption is an extreme one. In the model borrowing from abroad is so
costly that it becomes prohibitive for domestic entrepreneurs. This is typically not true
for the entire private domestic sector in an economy. However, as long as a fraction of the
domestic sector cannot tap international markets and the government can, the channels and
results of the paper will survive.
At date 0 the government issues public bonds which give a return at date 1. The supply is
fixed and normalized to one. The domestic entrepreneur will demand the bond as a way to
insure against the future liquidity shock. Foreign investors also demand these bonds in an
integrated sovereign debt market but they do not have a liquidity motive for holding debt.
Instead, they buy bonds as a saving vehicle.
Assumption 2. The only available security for the entrepreneur to insure against the liq-
uidity shock is the public bond. The supply of the public bond is fixed and it is issued in an
integrated debt market, where entrepreneurs compete for the asset with more patient foreign
investors.
The first part of this assumption acts only as a simplification. All the results of the model
would still hold even if entrepreneurs had access to other assets as long as the value of the
assets is not enough to fulfill the entrepreneur’s liquidity needs.
This simplification is especially applicable to financial crises when other asset prices collapse
and sovereign debt becomes a highly valued asset due to its safety and liquidity (IMF (2012),
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)) or for less financially developed countries
where alternatives are fewer as Gennaioli et al. (2014a) report.
The supply of bonds being fixed can be interpreted as the public borrowing needed to cover
an exogenous and fixed level of government expenditures. The focus of this paper is the
relative holdings of public debt between internationals and domestics and how the existence
of both types of investors shapes the introduction of financial innovation in sovereign debt
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markets. Thus, we are going to abstract from the bond supply decision and take it as
exogenous and fixed.
The last part of assumption 2, the fact that international investors are more patient than
domestics, should not be taken literally. It is a reduced form to capture a higher foreign
willingness to hold sovereign debt. When performing comparative statics, an increase in the
international discount factor can be interpreted as an increase in world risk or as an increase
in the available income internationally to invest in sovereign debt.
The government issues the bond at date 0 and receives q units of good per bond which it
transfers to consumers. It commits to repay and redeems the bond at date 1 by taxing con-
sumers and repaying bond holders the face value of their bond. The government’s taxation
power or fiscal capacity at t = 1 is uncertain and perfectly correlated with the liquidity shock
that hits the entrepreneur’s project. In particular at date 1, the government can tax η¯ when
s = sL and η when s = sH , where η < η¯ ≤ 1. Since the government commits to repay the
bond issued at date 0, if the government only issues one bond the its payoff structure will
be given by (η, η¯) in states (sH , sL) respectively.
Assumption 3. The fiscal capacity shock and the private sector liquidity shock are perfectly
correlated.
According to this assumption, the return of the public bond is low when liquidity needs in
the private sector are high. This contrasts with the assumption in Gennaioli et al. (2014b):
they assume public bonds give a higher return when liquidity needs are high. In their
model liquidity needs are high when investment opportunities are more profitable, which is
when the government’s incentive to repay the bonds is higher. The empirical evidence on
the relationship between liquidity needs and sovereign debt spreads in emerging economies
points in the direction of assumption 3. Papers such as Levy-Yeyati and Williams (2010)
and Peiris (2010) find that tighter liquidity conditions, that is, higher liquidity needs are
associated with higher country spreads in emerging economies. Higher country spreads are
consistent with lower fiscal resources but are not with a higher incentive to repay government
debt.
It is important to highlight, related to the above discussion, that this paper does not feature
sovereign risk in the sense of willingness to repay as a lot of the sovereign debt literature has
done. This paper models a government with commitment whose inability to repay because
of low fiscal resources triggers low returns in one of the states of the world. It does not
feature a government with inability to commit and strategic defaulting behavior. However
the payoff structure of the bond with commitment but risky fiscal capacity is observationally
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1511
equivalent at date 1 to a model where the government issues one bond and imposes a haircut
η¯ − η in one of the states of the world.
Assumption 3 is a reduced form way to capture the observed temporal connection between
banking crises and sovereign debt crises reported in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Arellano
and Kocherlakota (2012), Sosa-Padilla (2011), Balteanu and Erce (2012) and Borensztein
and Panizza (2008). This reduced-form assumption makes the analysis of the model highly
tractable and effective in capturing the empirical association between liquidity crises in the
private sector and lower repayment of public debt. This comes at a cost, namely, I abstract
away from strategic default and concentrate exclusively on ability to repay. In Appendix E
I relax this assumption and study the case where the fiscal capacity and the private sector
liquidity shock are positively but not perfectly correlated.
2.2 Demand from Investors
2.2.1 Demand from Domestic Investors
The entrepreneur maximizes her expected net return from the project. Since the entrepreneur
wants to maximize the initial investment scale of the project it is optimal to assign all
pledgeable returns ρ to consumers, keeping the illiquid return for helself: R − ρ of the
amount that is carried through.
Denoting by q the price of the liquid asset at t = 0, the entrepreneur’s problem is given by:
max{I,i(sH),i(sL),z} (R − ρ)(1 − λ)i(sL) + (R − ρ)λi(sH)
s.t. (ρ − sL)(1 − λ)i(sL) + (ρ − sH)λi(sH) + (λη + (1 − λ)η¯)z ≥ I − A + zq
i(sH)(sH − ρ) ≤ ηz
where i(sL) and i(sH) are the continuation scales in both states and z is the amount of bonds
bought at t = 0.
The first constraint is the entrepreneur’s budget constraint by which the entrepreneur’s
initial investment scale plus the purchase of the assets qz need to be less or equal than the
entrepreneur’s initial wealth plus the expected net return from the project and the expected
return from the asset. It corresponds to the consumer’s participation constraint. In order
for the consumer to be willing to lend to the entrepreneur at date 0 its expected return from
the project must be at least what the entrepreneur borrowed at date 0, I − A + zq.2
2The contract between entrepreneur and consumer will always assign all liquid or pledgeable returns to the
consumer in order to maximize the initial investment scale of the project. Thus, in state s = sL the consumer
will get a repayment of η¯z + (ρ − sL)i(sL) and in state s = sH the consumer obtains ηz + (ρ − sH)i(sH)
which corresponds to the left hand side of the budget constraint.
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The second constraint of the problem is the collateral constraint which imposes that the
outside funds required for reinvestment in the high liquidity shock state are less or equal to
the return from the liquid asset in that state of the world.
I assume that sL < ρ < sH < R which implies that when the liquidity shock is low the project
is self-financed and entrepreneur’s inside liquidity is enough to withstand the liquidity shock.
Instead when the liquidity shock is high the project needs prearranged financing. Thus in
state L full continuation is always optimal, i(sL) = I while in state H full continuation might
not be optimal. Denoting i(sH)
I
≡ χ and λη+(1−λ)η¯ ≡ Π we can rewrite the entrepreneur’s
problem as:
max{I,χ,z} (R − ρ)(1 − λ + λχ)I (1)
s.t. (ρ − sL)(1 − λ)I + λχ(ρ − sH)I + Πz ≥ I − A + zq
χI(sH − ρ) ≤ ηz
When q > Π, both constraints bind. Therefore, the collateral constraint expresses the
amount of bonds demanded by entrepreneurs at t = 0 in terms of the initial investment scale
I and the continuation scale χ as well as parameters:
z = χI(sH − ρ)
η
(2)
Intuitively the amount of bonds demanded is increasing in the continuation scale i(sH) and
decreasing in the bond’s repayment fraction in the high liquidity need state of the world, η.
Using this expression for z in the budget constraint, the initial investment is given by:
I = A
1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λχ(ρ − sH) + χ(sH−ρ)η [q − Π]
(3)
From (3) we see that I ′(χ) < 0, so the entrepreneur faces a scale-liquidity trade-off as in
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). If the entrepreneur wants to hold more liquidity to withstand
the future liquidity shock she has to choose a lower initial investment scale since both liquidity
hoarding and initial investment scale are chosen at date 0.
Maximizing the expected return of investment is equivalent to minimizing the unit cost of
investment
min{χ} c(χ, q, η, η¯, λ,Θ) ≡
1 + sL(1 − λ) + sHλχ + χ(sH−ρ)η [q − Π]
1 − λ + λχ
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where Θ ≡ (sH , sL, ρ) is a vector of parameters regarding the project. The solution to this
problem depends on the price of the bond q:
χ(q, η, η¯, λ,Θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if q ∈ [Π, qmax)
∈ (0, 1) if q = qmax
0 if q > qmax
where qmax is given by ∂c(χ,qmax,η,η¯,λ,Θ)
∂χ
= λη + (1 − λ)η¯ + λ(1+sL(1−λ)−sH)η(sH−ρ)(1−λ) .
Thus, the demand for liquidity from local investors is given below and it is denoted by zL.
It is decreasing in its price q:
zL(q, η, η¯, λ,Θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if q > qmax
χI(sH−ρ)
η if q = q
max, where χ ∈ (0, 1)
I(sH−ρ)
η if q ∈ (Π, qmax)
where I is given by substituting the price q in (3).
2.2.2 Demand from International Investors
The demand from foreign investors, zF , is given by their valuation of the bond, which is
determined by their discount factor and the bond’s expected payoff λη + (1 − λ)η¯ ≡ Π.
Their demand for bonds is perfectly elastic at q = β∗Π, they will demand any positive
amount of bonds as long as q = β∗Π.
2.3 Market Clearing
Market clearing in the bond market at t = 0 implies that zL(q, η, η¯, λ,Θ)+ zF (q, η, η¯, λ) = 1.
Necessarily q ≥ β∗Π, otherwise the demand from international investors would be infinite.
In this section we concentrate on the case where both types of investors hold part of the
debt issued and the project is fully continued in both states of the world, χ = 1. This is
equivalent to making the following parametric assumptions about the fiscal capacity in the
bad state of the world where the private sector is hit by the high liquidity shock:
η >
(sH − ρ) (A − (1 − λ)(β∗ − 1)η¯)
1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) + β∗λ(sH − ρ) (4)
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and about the foreign discount factor
β∗ < 1 + λ (1 + sL(1 − λ) − sH) η(sH − ρ)(1 − λ)Π (5)
The first condition ensures that there is enough liquidity for both types of investors to hold
the public debt and the second condition ensures that foreigners do not value public debt too
much and crowd-out domestic demand for public debt and the liquidity hoarding motive. In
Appendix B we characterize the equilibria for the cases where (4) and (5) do not hold.
When (4) holds international investors hold part of the supplied public bonds. Thus, their
valuation pins down the price of debt: q = β∗Π. The bond is sold at a premium, that
is, q − Π > 0, because β∗ > 1. If (5) also holds then q = β∗Π < qmax. Thus, at date 0
the demand from international investors is given by the section of the domestic demand for
bonds where q ∈ (Π, qmax). In that case χ = 1, the project is fully continued. Substituting
this and the price for the public asset in (3) we obtain the initial scale of investment which
is given by
I = A
1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH) + (sH − ρ)(β∗ − 1)(λ + (1 − λ) η¯η )
(6)
and is proportional to the entrepreneur’s initial wealth A. It is multiplied by the equity
multiplier 1[
1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH)+(sH−ρ)(β∗−1)(λ+(1−λ) η¯η )
] > 1 which defines the maximum the
entrepreneur can leverage its own initial capital.
We see that the maximum leverage per unit of own capital is increasing in the pledgeable
return ρ. It is decreasing in the total expected cost of the project 1+ sL(1−λ)+ sHλ. Most
importantly, for the purposes of this paper, it is decreasing in the cost of liquidity hoarding
for the private sector which is the given by last sumand in the denominator in (6).
Two points are worth highlighting regarding the cost of liquidity hoarding. First, for the
liquidity hoarding to have an effect on the equity multiplier and decrease investment it is
key that foreign investors are more patient than domestics. If β∗ were to equal 1 the level
of investment would equal A1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH) and would not be affected by the demand
and cost of liquidity. The intuition for this is that if foreign investors were as patient as
domestics, since they do not demand public debt as a way to hoard liquidity but in order to
save, they would drive the premium at which public debt is sold, q − Π, to 0. The domestic
entrepreneurs would be able to buy liquidity at no cost. This would increase the level of
investment.
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Second, the novel relationship that this model delivers is that the investment level is de-
creasing in the ratio of fiscal capacities in the low and high liquidity need states. With only
one public bond the η¯η ratio parametrizes the amount of wasted liquidity. Wasted liquidity
is the amount of useless liquidity that the entrepreneur is forced to purchase when she does
not need it (η¯) for each unit of liquidity she buys for the state when she does need the return
(η). Equilibrium investment is decreasing in the wasted liquidity, the lower this quantity is,
the higher investment. The intuition for this is that wasted liquidity increases the cost of
liquidity hoarding which in turn allows the entrepreneur to leverage her intial wealth further.
The amount of bonds demanded by local entrepreneurs is I(sH−ρ)η where substituting I for
its expression (6) and rearranging we obtain:
zL = A(sH − ρ)
η [1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH)] + (sH − ρ)(β∗ − 1)Π (7)
which is decreasing in the asset returns η and η¯.
At price q = β∗Π international investors will demand any residual bonds not demanded by
locals. By market clearing the quantity of bonds demanded by internationals is the following:
zF = 1 − zL (8)
2.4 Comparative Statics
A number of comparative statics are interesting to understand the workings of the model
and will be relevant for the empirical analysis. For the purpose of the comparative statics
we can set η¯ = 1. This implies that in the good state when liquidity needs are low the
government can fully redeem the public bond by taxing consumers. In the bad state when
private liquidity needs are high the government bond pays: η ≡ η < 1.
An increase in sH and a decrease in sL such that the total cost per unit of investment,
1− (ρ − sL)(1− λ)− λ(ρ − sH), remains constant brings about an increase in the amount of
debt held by locals and by market clearing, a decrease in the amount of debt in the hands
of international investors. An increase in sH is akin to a tightening of domestic collateral
constraints which increases the need for public liquidity, increasing the demand for bonds at
home. Initial investment scale I decreases because of the scale-liquidity trade-off: the higher
the reinvestment shock in bad times, the higher the liquidity provision that the entrepreneur
must make at date 0 and thus the lower the initial investment scale the entrepreneur can
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choose. Another way of seeing this is that an increase in sH decreases the equity multiplier
which in turn decreases the maximum the entrepreneur can leverage her own wealth.
An increase in the repayment fraction η decreases the amount of bonds held by domestics,
since local demand for public bonds is decreasing in the amount the bonds repay. By market
clearing the amount of debt held by international investors increases. Intuitively if each bond
now gives a higher return, the entrepreneur will need less of them to save for the liquidity
shock. The total amount of liquidity held by domestic entrepreneurs, ηzL increases since
ηzL =
A(sH − ρ)
1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH) + (sH − ρ)(β∗ − 1)(λ + 1−λη )
when q = β∗Π. This amount is increasing in η. Investment increases because of the wasted
liquidity force described before. An increase in η implies a return at s = sH closer to 1 which
lowers wasted liquidity purchased by the entrepreneur for state s = sL.
Finally, an increase in the patience of international investors parametrized by an increase in
β∗ decreases the local demand for bonds and lowers domestic investment. A higher inter-
national discount rate increases the price of the public bond for domestic entrepreneurs too
because debt markets are integrated. Domestic investment is also lower when international
investors become more patient because the increase in β∗ increases the effective cost of in-
vestment. The increased demand from international investors crowds-out domestic demand
for bonds and domestic investment. The comparative statics with β∗ is a reduced form way
to capture an increase in the foreign demand for government provided liquidity.
The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics presented so far:
Proposition 1. For a given level of expected cost of investment, 1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH):
(i) ∂zL
∂sH
> 0, ∂zF
∂sH
< 0 and ∂I
∂sH
< 0; (ii) ∂zL
∂η
< 0, ∂zF
∂η
> 0 and ∂I
∂η
> 0; (iii) ∂zL
∂β∗ < 0,
∂zF
∂β∗ > 0
and ∂I
∂β∗ < 0.
3 Financial Innovation
As we have seen domestic investment decreases with unused liquidity that the public asset
provides. Therefore, the government has some room to improve its provision of domestic
liquidity. It will do so by introducing multiple debt instruments. In this section I suppose
that the government issues two assets and chooses payoffs (xH1 , xL1 ) and (xH2 , xL2 ) respectively
in states s = sL and s = sH to maximize total welfare.
It is worth noting that the government does not make international competition for the assets
dissappear. The government will sell both assets in integrated debt markets. Allowing
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1511
the government to segment markets and sell the risky public asset to both investors but
at different prices is unrealistic, especially with the existence of secondary markets which
allow trading among investors (Broner et al. (2010)). Furthermore, although banning all
competition from abroad could potentially be implemented by imposing capital controls,
this is not welfare-improving. See appendix C for details and for how the model in this
paper compares to others where capital controls can be welfare-improving.
The crucial gain of financial innovation is the improvement of liquidity provision through
the channel of unused or wasted liquidity. In this section we will see how.
3.1 Entrepreneur’s Problem
To study the government’s problem we first need to know what the behavior of the en-
trepreneur will be with two assets available as liquidity hoarding vehicles. The problem
looks as follows and it is a generalization of Problem 1:
max{χ,z1,z2,I} (R − ρ)(1 − λ + λχ)I (9)
s.t. (ρ − sL)(1 − λ)I + λχ(ρ − sH)I + Π1z1 + Π2z2 ≥
I − A + z1q1 + z2q2
χI(sH − ρ) ≤ xH1 z1 + xH2 z2
where Π1 and Π2 denote the expected payoffs of both assets: Π1 = λxH1 + (1 − λ)xL1 and
Π2 = λxH2 + (1 − λ)xL2 .
Proposition 2. When q1 > Π1 and q2 > Π2 both constraints bind.
Proof. To see this, note that q1 ≥ Π1 and q2 ≥ Π2. The price of the assets can never go
below their expected values, otherwise consumers who are assumed to have a big endowment
would want to postpone all their consumption to date 1. This would drive the price of the
liquid assets to their date 1 values, which are the expected values. At this price consumers
will be indifferent between buying the assets or not.
If q1 > Π1 or q2 > Π2, only entrepreneurs will demand the assets since they have a higher
valuation for them. To see that if q1 > Π1 and q2 > Π2 the budget constraint binds, we
rewrite it as:
ρ(1 − λ + λχ)I − sL(1 − λ)I − sHλχI ≥ I − A + (q1 − Π1)z1 + (q2 − Π2)z2 (10)
Since ρ(1 − λ + λχ)I enters negatively the entrepreneur’s objective function, she will make
this term as small as possible choosing to just satisfy the constraint. The collateral constraint
binds for q1 > Π1 and q2 > Π2 because the entrepreneur will choose z1 and z2 just enough
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to cover the liquidity needs in the high liquidity shock state. Demanding more than this
amount would imply that the right-hand side of the budget constraint in (10) increases.
Since the budget constraint binds this would increase ρ(1 − λ + λχ), which would lower the
entrepreneur’s objective function.
Denote by  the unit cost of liquidity. The entrepreneur will choose the asset that will
minimize her unit cost of liquidity, that is:  = min
{
q1−Π1
xH1
, q2−Π2
xH2
}
. Suppose for concreteness
that asset j minimizes  and that asset j provides enough liquidity in state s = sH to cover
all reinvestment needs. In that case z−j = 0 since the entrepreneur does not want to purchase
the liquidity using the asset that provides it at a higher cost.
As before international investors demand any amount of the asset as long as qj ≤ β∗Πj,
with strict equality if international investors hold part of asset j. As long as fiscal capacity
is big enough international investors hold partly or completely both assets and qj = β∗Πj
for both j3. Since β∗ > 1 both constraints in the entrepreneur’s problem bind as proven in
Proposition 2.
Thus, from the collateral constraint I obtain the local demand for the relatively cheap asset:
χI(sH − ρ)
xHj
= zLj (11)
The parametric assumption on fiscal capacity ensures that this asset is enough to cover
liquidity needs for the entrepreneur. In that case zL−j = 0. Substituting in the budget
constraint and solving for investment we obtain:
I = A1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λχ(ρ − sH) + χ(sH − ρ) (12)
The entrepreneur’s unit cost minimization problem is given below:
min{χ}
1 + sL(1 − λ) + sHλχ + χ(sH − ρ)
1 − λ + λχ ≡ c(, χ)
3As in the benchmark model I concentrate on the case where the marginal buyer is the international
investor for both types of assets. This is ensured as long as η > A(sH − ρ)/1− (ρ − sL)(1− λ)− λ(ρ − sH)+
(sH − ρ)λ(β∗ − 1).
The solution for the continuation scale χ is the following:
χ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if  ∈ (0, max)
∈ (0, 1) if  = max
0 if  > max
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where max is a threshold value. To see that this is the schedule for the continuation
scale note that problem (9) is linear in I. Therefore we only need to evaluate the util-
ity levels corresponding to χ = 0 (continuing only when the shock is low) and χ = 1
(always continuing). The unit cost for χ = 0, c(χ = 0, ) = 1+sL(1−λ)1−λ and c(χ = 1, ) =
1 + sL(1 − λ) + sHλ + (sH − ρ). Comparing these we obtain that c(χ = 1, ) < c(χ = 0, )
if and only if
 <
λ
(1 − λ)(sH − ρ) +
(sL − sH)λ
sH − ρ ≡ 
max (13)
which equals ∂c(χ,max)
∂χ
= 0. I will impose throughout that  < max and the project is
continued at full scale in both states of the world. In this case, investment as a function of
 is given by the following expression:
I() = A1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH) + (sH − ρ) (14)
From here we see that ∂I(.)
∂
< 0: the investment level is decreasing in the unit cost of liquidity.
3.2 Planner’s Objective and Constraints
Domestic welfare W is given by the utility of consumption enjoyed by entrepreneurs and
consumers in the three periods. Both agents have linear utility of consumption and do not
discount future payoffs. We assume for this section that the government always wants to
fully continue in both states of the world χ = 1.4
Entrepreneurs consume the expected rent from their investment at date 2. Consumers lend
a part A − I + q1z1 + q2z2 of their endowment E to finance the project initially and for the
entrepreneur to prearrange for the future liquidity need. They obtain a return of xL1 z1 +
xL2 z2 + (ρ − sL)I when the liquidity shock is low and obtain xH1 z1 + xH2 z2 + (ρ − sH)I when
the liquidity shock is high. Also, at date 0 they obtain the proceeds from the total asset
4As in section 2 for this to be optimal we impose an upper bound on the foreign discount factor β∗
which will ensure that the prices of the public assets are not too high. In particular, if we assume β∗ − 1 <
1+(sL−sH)(1−λ)
(sH−ρ)(1−λ) , χ = 1 will be optimal for the two financial innovations problems that we study in this
section.
issuance q1 and q2 and are taxed the face value of both assets at date 1.
Thus, the utility expressions respectively for entrepeneurs and consumers are given by:
UE = (R − ρ)I
UC = E + A − I − q1z1 − q2z2 + (ρ − sL)(1 − λ)I + (ρ − sH)λI
+(q1 − Π1) + (q2 − Π2) + Π1z1 + Π2z2
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Total welfare equals:
W = E + A + [R(1 − λ + λχ) − sL (1 − λ) − sHλχ − 1] I (15)
+(q1 − Π1)(1 − z1) + (q2 − Π2)(1 − z2)
By market clearing 1− z1 equals the amount of asset held by international investors, zF1 and
similarly for asset 2. Therefore, welfare can be rewritten as:
W = E + A + [R(1 − λ + λχ) − sL (1 − λ) − sHλχ − 1] I (16)
+(q1 − Π1)zF1 + (q2 − Π2)zF2
This expression is intuitive. The government wants to maximize the total net suplus from
the investment and the liquidity premia, q1 − Π1 and q2 − Π2 obtained from international
investors. The liquidity premium paid by entrepreneurs to consumers is a transfer across
agents which cancels out in the welfare calculation and only the premia coming from abroad
matter for welfare in the economy.
The government is constrained by its fiscal capacity. The sum of the payoffs of both assets
in each of the states of the world cannot be larger than the government’s fiscal capacity in
that state of the world:
xL1 + xL2 ≤ 1 (17)
xH1 + xH2 ≤ η (18)
3.2.1 Monotonicity Requirement
If payoffs satisfy monotonicity it must be the case that for both assets:
xL ≥ xH (19)
We start our analysis without considering this restriction in section 3.3. Then, we add the
more realistic assumption that public assets pay less in the state of the world that fiscal
capacity is low.
In our discussion of assumption 3 in the set-up of the benchmark model in section 2 we
argued that the state where fiscal capacity is low and the private liquidity shock is high
corresponds to a “twin crisis” state, meaning a simultaneous banking and sovereign debt
crisis.
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A sovereign debt crisis is typically resolved with a sovereign debt restructuring process which
ends with haircuts on investors.5 Allowing for violations of (19) would imply that haircuts on
some debt instruments are negative. Although there is no systematic data about haircuts at
the debt instrument level, this seems unrealistic. We can imagine assets affected differently
after a sovereign debt restructuring. For example, we can expect long-term debt more
affected than short-term. Long-term debt due date can be adjourned and the payments will
be rescheduled. It is more likely that short-term will be paid-off quicker and hence experience
no haircut or a small one. In any case, it seems unlikely that it will have a negative haircut
and some assets will gain from the sovereign debt restructuring process.
Also bonds issued under different laws might differ in the final recouped investment. Those
under local law are normally hit stronger by a sovereign debt restructuring than those issued
under the UK or US law where creditor litigation has increased dramatically the amount
of recouped investment (Schumacher et al. (2013)). Again, however, bonds under UK or
US law do not recoup more than they invested after a sovereign debt restructuring process
which would be the implication of violating (19).
3.3 Planner’s Problem without Monotonicity Requirements
As a benchmark, I start the analysis with the problem without monotonicity constraints.
The planner maximizes expected welfare (16) choosing the asset payoffs and the minimum
cost of liquidity hoarding for the entrepreneur, . In doing so the government is subject to
the fiscal capacity constraints and internalizes the effect that its choice has on investment,
demand for the public assets and prices.
5See Cruces and Trebesch (2013) for a haircut database of recent sovereign debt restructurings.
The government solves the following problem:
max{xH1 ,xL1 ,xH2 ,xL2 ,} W ≡ E + A + [R − sL (1 − λ) − sHλ − 1] I() (20)
+(q1 − Π1)(1 − z1()) + (q2 − Π2)(1 − z2())
s.t.
xL1 + xL2 ≤ 1 (21)
xH1 + xH2 ≤ η (22)
I = A1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH) + (sH − ρ) (23)
 = min
{
q1 − Π1
xH1
,
q2 − Π2
xH2
}
(24)
0 ≤ zj() ≤ 1 (25)
qj ≥ β∗Πj with inequality only if zj() = 1 (26)
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where j = {1, 2} and Πj are assets’ expected payoffs defined above.
Constraints (21) and (22) are the fiscal capacity constraints. Equation (23) gives the ex-
pression for investment from the entrepreneur’s problem which depends on the unit cost of
liquidity  which is defined in (24) and is also a constraint on the planner’s problem.
Constraints (25) and (26) impose market clearing considerations in the planner’s problem
and short-selling constraints. Equation (25) imposes that the local demand for asset j, zj()
which depends on the cost of liquidity, cannot be bigger than the total supply of asset j
which is normalized to 1. Also, zj() ≥ 0 because agents cannot short-sell the public assets.
Equation (26) is just saying that asset prices will be pinned down by international investors’
valuation if they hold the asset, that is if zj() < 1 and will be strictly above international
investors’ valuation only when all of the supplied asset j is held domestically (zj() = 1).
The approach to solve this problem is to solve a slightly modified version with fewer con-
straints and a modified objective and then check that the solution obtained satisfies initial
constraints and that the objective takes the same value in the original objective. Thus, we
start by modifying the objective W .
From constraint (26) we see that the government is not free to choose any quantity for the
liquidity premia coming from foreigners. The maximum the government can obtain from
foreigners for each asset j is (β∗ − 1)Πj. A liquidity premium higher than that would imply
that all the supplied assets are held domestically (zj() = 1 for both assets) and the liquidity
premia coming from foreigners goes to zero. Note also that Πj ≤ 1. This implies that we
can bound the liquidity premia coming from international investors:
0 ≤ (q1 − Π1)(1 − z1()) + (q2 − Π2)(1 − z2()) (27)
≤ (β∗ − 1)(1 − z1()) + (β∗ − 1)(1 − z2())
where the first inequality in (27) holds with equality only when z1 = z2 = 1.
Therefore we can write a slightly modified welfare objective W˜ which is an upper bound on
W which is given by:
W˜ ≡ E + A + [R − sL (1 − λ) − sHλ − 1] I + (28)
(β∗ − 1)(1 − z1()) + (β∗ − 1)(1 − z2())
The constraint on asset prices contained in (25) also imposes a lower bound on the unit cost
of liquidity , namely  ≥ (β∗−1)Πj
xHj
= (β
∗−1)Πj
xHj
= (β∗ − 1)
(
λ + (1 − λ) xLj
xHj
)
where I have used
the definition of Πj. The lower bound on  is given by:
 ≥ λ(β∗ − 1) (29)
with equality only when xLj = 0 for asset j.
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Using the modified objective (28) and the lower bound on unit cost of liquidity (29) we can
rewrite the planner’s problem in terms of the implemented fiscal capacity allocations. After
solving for these we will find the asset combination that implements them.
Denote fiscal capacity allocations by F . In (FLD, FLF , FHD , FHF ) superscripts denote state of the
world and subscripts denote the holder. Then FLD denotes how much of the fiscal capacity in
s = sL is allocated to domestics. FLF denotes how much of that capacity is allocated abroad
in the good state of the world. Similarly for FHD and FHF . Finally denote (L, H) as the unit
cost of liquidity in both states of the world.
max{H ,FLF ,FHD ,FHF } E + A + [R − sL (1 − λ) − sHλ − 1] I + (30)
λ(β∗ − 1)FHF + (1 − λ)(β∗ − 1)FLF
s.t.
I = A1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH) + (sH − ρ)H (31)
FHD ≥ I(sH − ρ) (32)
H ≥ λ(β∗ − 1) (33)
FHD + FHF ≤ η (34)
FLD + FLF ≤ 1 (35)
The planner’s problem given by (30) above maximizes the returns from investment and the
liquidity premia coming from abroad subject to the behavior coming from the entrepreneur’s
problem. In particular (31) gives the expression for investment in terms of parameters and
the liquidity premium in state s = sH . Constraint (32) rewrites the collateral constraint
in terms of the new variables: it is just saying that the amount of fiscal capacity held by
domestics in state s = sH has to be greater or equal than the reinvestment need in that
state of the world. Constraint (33) gives the lower bound for the liquidity premium that we
obtained above. Finally the government needs to satisfy the fiscal capacity constraints (34)
and (35).
To solve this problem, first note that the objective function is increasing in investment I.
Since I ′(H) < 0 the planner chooses the minimum possible H , that is: H = λ(β∗ − 1) from
(33) with equality. This pins down investment I = A1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH)+(sH−ρ)λ(β∗−1) ≡ I∗∗.
Second, note that the planner’s aim is to make FHD as small as possible. The reason for
this is that increasing FHD , decreases FHF from (34). The planner wants to provide just
the indispensable liquidity to entrepreneurs and maximize the financial flows coming from
abroad. Then (32) holds with equality, FHD = I∗∗(sH − ρ) and FLD = 0.
Finally fiscal constraints and (35) hold with equality or else fiscal capacity would be wasted.
The optimal fiscal capacity allocation without monotonicity constraints is given in the propo-
sition below.
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Proposition 3. Without monotonicity constraints on asset payoffs, the optimal fiscal ca-
pacity allocation is given by:
FHD = I∗∗(sH − ρ)
FLD = 0
FHF = η − I∗∗(sH − ρ)
FLF = 1
where I∗∗ = A1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH)+(sH−ρ)λ(β∗−1) and it is the level of investment pinned down
by I(H = λ(β∗ − 1)).
As I argued above, the allocation provides just enough liquidity domestically to attain the
desired level of investment. When the government is not constrained by monotonicity it
does not supply any liquidity to domestics in s = sL and FLD = 0. In that state of the
world private liquidity covers reinvestment needs and all fiscal capacity is allocated abroad
to maximize foreign capital flows.
Since β∗ > 1 the premia coming from abroad are a positive income flow for consumers. They
are taxed the expected payoffs when repayment is due at date 1 but obtain a flow higher
than that at date 0 when assets are sold.
3.4 Planner’s Problem with Monotonic Asset Payoffs
The problem when the planner is not subject to monotonicity requirements is simply (20)
including a monotonicity constraint. To solve the problem in terms of fiscal capacity allo-
cations we still solve a slightly modified version of the problem where we impose an upper
bound welfare W˜ like in (28).
However the lower bound on unit cost of liquidity is now higher than (29). To see this
note that  ≥ (β∗−1)Πj
xHj
= (β
∗−1)Πj
xHj
= (β∗ − 1)
(
λ + (1 − λ) xLj
xHj
)
which under monotonicity
requirements xLj ≥ xHj cannot be smaller than  ≥ β∗ −1. This condition holds with equality
when xLj = xHj . We see that when the government is constrained by monotonicity the
minimum payoff in state s = sL it can choose is the same as in s = sH , which increases the
minimum unit cost of liquidity it can attain.
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The problem in terms of fiscal capacity allocations is the following:
max{H ,FLF ,FHD ,FHF } E + A + [R − sL (1 − λ) − sHλ − 1] I + (36)
λ(β∗ − 1)FHF + (1 − λ)(β∗ − 1)FLF
s.t.
I = A1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH) + (sH − ρ)H (37)
FHD ≥ I(sH − ρ) (38)
H ≥ β∗ − 1 (39)
FHD + FHF ≤ η (40)
FLD + FLF ≤ 1 (41)
FLD ≥ FHD ; FLF ≥ FHF (42)
The planner’s problem given by (36) is very similar to the one with no monotonicity require-
ments. The only differences are a higher upper bound on the liquidity premium (39) and
the monotonicity constraints (42). They require the amount of fiscal capacity held by both
types of agents, domestics and foreigners, in the low liquidity shock state be greater or equal
to what they hold in the high liquidity shock state.
The reasoning to obtain the solution is also very similar to above. The government wants to
minimize H since I ′(H) < 0. Thus the planner chooses the minimum possible that is: H =
β∗−1 from (39) with equality. This pins down investment I = A1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH)+(sH−ρ)(β∗−1) ≡
I∗. The planner’s aim is to make FHD as small as possible. From (40) we see that increasing
FHD necessarily decreases FHF because fiscal capacity is limited and this lowers the objective
function. Then (38) will hold with equality.
Also (42) for domestics must hold with equality FLD = FHD . The argument is similar to
above, making FLD higher than just necessary would lower FLF from (41) which again lowers
the objective function. As before fiscal constraints (40) and (41) hold with equality. Under
this allocation the monotonicity constraint for foreigners is slack. The optimal fiscal capacity
allocation is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under monotonicity constraints, the optimal fiscal capacity allocations are:
FHD = FLD = I∗(sH − ρ)
FHF = η − I∗(sH − ρ)
FLF = 1 − I∗(sH − ρ)
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where I∗ = A1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH)+(sH−ρ)(β∗−1) and it is the level of investment pinned down by
I(H = β∗ − 1).
The allocation is intuitive. As before the planner wants to provide just the indispensable
liquidity to entrepreneurs. However in this case it is constrained by monotonicity and has to
provide the same amount in the good state of the world even if the project is self-financed.
As before, all residual fiscal capacity is allocated abroad to exploit the high willingness to
pay for the domestic assets international investors have.
3.5 Assets that Implement Optimal Fiscal Capacity Allocations
A payoff structure that implements the fiscal capacity allocation under no monotonicity
corresponds to the Arrow-Debreu securities given by:
xH1 = η, xL1 = 0
xH2 = 0, xL2 = 1
in which fiscal capacity in each state of the world is supplied in the form of one asset.
Indeed this combination implements the fiscal capacity allocations given in subsection 3.3.
The fiscal capacity allocated to domestics in both states of the world equals:
FHD = z1xH1 + z2xH2 (43)
FLD = z1xL1 + z2xL2 (44)
where z1and z2 is the demand coming from domestic for each asset.
Given these two assets the entrepreneur will choose to hold asset 1 since it is the only asset
that provides liquidity in state s = sH . The expected asset payoff Π1 = ηλ which makes
 = λ(β∗ − 1).
The domestic demand for asset 1 equals z1 = I
∗∗(sH−ρ)
η
and z2 = 0. The foreign demand for
both assets equal zF1 = 1 − z1 = 1 − I
∗∗(sH−ρ)
η
and zF2 = 1. Plugging these and the payoffs
in (43) and (44) for both types of investors we obtain the optimal fiscal capacity allocations
from Proposition 3.
Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) show that non-contingent debt of different
maturities can implement any Arrow-Debreu allocation. In particular, with two states of the
world the government can implement the Arrow-Debreu allocation issuing long-run bonds
and holding short-run bonds. However, in the financial innovation problem I consider I do
not allow the government to hold one of the assets, constraint (25) states that zj() ≥ 0.
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This that appears as a constraint in the planner’s problem emerges from the entrepeneur’s
problem. Looking at the collateral constraint in Problem 9 we see that the entrepreneur does
not want to hold negative amounts of any asset because that would make her constraint more
binding. International investors also do not want to sell any of the assets because they are
patient investors who prefer a return at date 1 than an income flow at date 0.
Also, the problem I am interested in studies what is the optimal structure of the assets the
government issues to maximize domestic investment and financial flows from abroad.
Furthermore as Debortoli et al. (2014) points out completing the market with bonds of
different maturities as in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) requires very large
positions relative to the size of the economy. For these two reasons I consider the Arrow-
Debreu allocation as a theoretical benchmark and will concentrate on the optimal financial
innovation under monotonicity.
Under monotonicity the payoff structure that implements the fiscal capacity allocation is a
safe and a risky asset:
xH1 = η, xL1 = η
xH2 = 0, xL2 = 1 − η
In this case again the entrepreneur will again only demand asset 1 since it pays in state H.
Its expected payoff Π1 = η, and thus  = β∗ − 1.
Since the entrepreneur does not buy asset 2, z2 = 0. From the collateral constraint (11)
z1 = I
∗(sH−ρ)
η
. The foreign demand for asset 2 is all the asset supplied zF2 = 1 because
domestics hold none of this asset and zF1 = 1 − z1 = 1 − I
∗(sH−ρ)
η
. The fiscal capacity
allocations that are attained with this combination of assets is exactly the optimal one from
Proposition 4.
The ESBies proposal in Brunnermeier et al. (2011) implements a fiscal capacity allocation
like this one for the European Union. In their proposal a European Debt Agency (EDA)
would buy the sovereign bonds of member nations according to some fixed weights and issue
a senior and a junior tranch on the portfolio of bonds. A similar implementation at the
country level would have governments issuing senior and junior bonds. We have seen no
financial innovation like this in sovereign debt markets.
The closest counterpart we observe in sovereign debt markets are bonds with different relative
riskiness. For example, local and foreign currency debt. Local currency debt would be the
relatively riskier debt instrument since devaluations and currency depreciations occur more
frequently in bad times. Foreign currency debt would be the relatively safe asset. This will
be the focus of the analysis in the empirical section of the paper.
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4 The Benefits of Financial Innovation and Comple-
mentarities with Financial Integration
To start, it is worth noting that the planner problems given in subsections 3.3 and 3.4 were
subject to the same fiscal capacity constraints as in the scenario with only one defaultable
bond. Thus government revenues are identical in all scenarios. In the case with one bond the
government revenues are given by β∗(1−λ+λη), which is identical to the level of government
revenues in the other two scenarios when we add the revenues accruing from both assets.
Despite keeping fiscal capacity constant the government is increasing domestic investment
when it issues two different securities. In particular we find the following:
Proposition 5. Let I∗∗ denote the investment level with Arrow-Debreu securities. Let I∗
denote the investment level with one safe and one risky bond. Finally let I denote investment
with one risky bond. We have I∗∗ ≥ I∗ ≥ I with strict inequality when fiscal capacity
η > (sH−ρ)(A−(β
∗−1)λ)
1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH) for the first inequality and η >
(sH−ρ)(A−(β∗−1))
1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH) for the second.
For the argument we concentrate on the case where the fiscal capacity conditions are met and
thus both domestic and international investors hold part of the public asset held by domestics
to hoard investment. In this case financial innovation increases investment. Furthermore,
investment is highest when the government issues Arrow-Debreu securities and lowest one it
issues only one defaultable bond.
The intuition for this result is that by issuing two different assets the government tranches its
fiscal capacity and reduces the wasted liquidity, that is, the amount of uneeded liquidity the
entrepreneur purchases per unit of outside liquidity required in the bad state of the world.
The lower the wasted liquidity, the higher the domestic investment because the local investors
can leverage more their wealth. We see this by comparing the case with Arrow-Debreu
securities and with one safe and one risky asset. In the former case, when the entrepreneur
buys asset 1 she does not buy any wasted liquidity because the asset’s payoff in that state of
the world is 0. In the latter case, when the government is issuing a safe asset the entrepreneur
has to buy some liquidity for the state she will not use it.
The cost of the wasted liquidity in this model comes from the existence of international
investors. The model features a crowding-out effect coming from international investors’
demand for public bonds. This high demand from foreign investors is captured by the higher
discount factor abroad β∗ > 1 and drives up the price of the public bond. The government
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by tranching its fiscal capacity and decreasing wasted liquidity decreases the cost of liquidity
hoarding for entrepreneurs without imposing capital controls6.
Finally, financial innovation introduces assets especially designed to attract international
investors who are risk-neutral and demand the assets as a savings vehicle.
It is worth noting that if the economy is in autarky then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6. Under autarky, investment denoted as IAut does not depend on the ratio
of fiscal capacities η¯/η. Thus, investment and welfare are equal under financial innovation
than without.
In this model we see that the benefits of financial innovation arise when sovereign debt
markets are integrated. In Appendix D we find the equilibria when foreign investors cannot
buy public debt in sovereign debt markets. In both equilibria, with high and low fiscal
capacity, investment would not be affected by financial innovation.7The government cannot
improve the allocation by changing the payoff structure.
5 Comparative Statics
In this section I perform comparative statics for the scenario with one safe and one risky
asset. The comparative statics regard the relative holdings of safe to risky asset for different
types of investors.
An increase in sH and a decrease in sL such that the total cost per unit of investment,
1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH), remains constant brings about an increase in the international
relative holdings of risky to safe asset. The intuition for this is that the tightening of collateral
constraints increases the domestic demand for the safe asset. By market clearing, the amount
of safe asset held by international investors decreases. The international holdings of risky
asset are always equal to the amount supplied. Thus, the relative holdings of risky to safe
increase because the denominator decreases.
An increase in fiscal capacity η decreases the relative holdings of risky to safe asset. The
reason for this is that an increase in η lowers the domestic demand for the safe asset because
now every bond pays more. Thus international investors need to hold more of the safe asset
which decreases the ratio of risky to safe assets held by foreigners.
6See Appendix C for a discussion on capital controls in this model.
7More broadly we can think of sovereign debt markets open to different types of investors with different
motives to hold debt and with a higher demand for the public bond. In the model presented in this paper
these are foreign investors. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that shows a steady increase in
the share of debt held by foreigners for emerging and advanced economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) and
Arslanalp and Tsuda (2012)).
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An increase in the patience of international investors parametrized in an increase in β∗
increases the foreign demand for the safe asset because being more patient they demand
more of all assets. This decreases the ratio of risky to safe international holdings since as in
the previous scenarios risky asset holdings are fixed and normalized to 1.
Proposition 7. Let zF1 denote the foreign holdings of the risky asset and zF2 the foreign
holdings of the safe asset. Then for a given level of 1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH), (i)
∂(zF1 /zF2 )
∂sH
> 0, (ii) ∂(z
F
1 /z
F
2 )
∂η
< 0, and (iii) ∂(z
F
1 /z
F
2 )
∂β∗ < 0.
6 Empirical Analysis
6.1 Objective and Data
In this section I test the comparative statics in propositions 1 and 7 regarding public debt
ownership as a whole and ownership of relatively riskier sovereign debt instruments. To
do this I construct a panel dataset of 21 emerging economies between 2004 and 2010. The
countries included in the sample are emerging markets from Asia, Latin America, countries
in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) that are in the European Union and others that
are not. See Appendix F.1 for a complete list of countries included and data sources.
With this data I test the two sets of predictions. First, the ones regarding sovereign debt
ownership. For this I use the share of sovereign debt held abroad. Second, I test the
predictions regarding ownership of riskier debt instruments. For this I use the share of Local
Currency (LC) sovereign debt held abroad because devaluations and currency depreciations
occur more frequently in bad times. In other words, LC debt has a more cyclical payoff
structure than foreign currency debt. For the purpose of the model, the asset with the
cyclical payoff structure is the risky debt instrument.
Propositions 1 and 7 give predictions on the effect of tightening of collateral constraints,
fiscal capacity, and foreign discount factor have on them.
For tightening of collateral constraints I use two measures. First, a measure of domestic
availability of credit: private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions.
This measure has been used extensively in the literature about credit market development
and financial frictions (Gennaioli et al. (2014a), Gennaioli et al. (2014b), and Alfaro et al.
(2008)). Second, I use an inverse measure of banks’ leverage: banks’ capital to assets. As
we saw in subsection 2.4 an increase in sH decreases the equity multiplier of the productive
sector, the maximum the private sector can leverage its initial wealth. Therefore the leverage
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ratio decreases which automatically implies that in the model the inverse leverage increases
after an increase in sH .
For fiscal capacity I use three different proxies used often in the development economics
literature (Dincecco and Prado (2012), Baskaran and Bigsten (2013)). Tax revenues over
GDP, direct tax revenues on income, profits, and capital gains as a percentage of government
revenues or as a percentage of tax revenues. For all of them higher levels imply a higher
fiscal capacity of the government or the economy’s fiscal effort. Another way to capture fiscal
capacity in the model is through sovereign debt spreads. The analysis before proposition 1
normalized fiscal capacity in good times to 1 and then performed comparative statics with
fiscal capacity in bad times. Therefore an increase in fiscal capacity in bad times η captures
a decrease in the riskiness in the returns of the public asset: payoffs of the public asset are
more similar. Riskiness of sovereign debt is typically captured by the sovereign debt spread
and it is an inverse measure of fiscal capacity.
Finally, as an inverse measure of the international discount factor I use the federal funds
rate. Since interest rates are inversely related to discount factors, a lower federal funds rate
implies a higher degree of world impatience. Another way of seeing this is that a low federal
funds rate makes investors search for yield in other investments, which can rationalize a high
willingness to hold sovereign debt.
I would like to highlight that this analysis does not make any causal claims. This section
presents evidence using regression analysis consistent with the previous model. There could
be other channels explaining the associations that I find in the data. To mitigate as much
as possible these concerns, I control for several relevant variables as well as including time
and country fixed effects to control for global shocks and for time-invariant country-specific
characteristics. I will also discuss in the last subsection other possible channels.
6.2 Comparative Statics on Sovereign Debt Ownership
The specification used to test the comparative statics regarding sovereign debt ownership as
a whole contained in proposition 1 are the following:
% debt abroadit = αi + λt + β1Collateralit + β2Fiscal Capacityit + γXit + uit (45)
% debt abroadit = αi + β3Federal Funds Ratet + γX˜it + uit (46)
where the dependent variable is the share of total outstanding public debt held by inter-
national investors. The term αi are country fixed effects, which control for time-invariant
country-specific factors which can affect the share of sovereign debt held abroad (eg. insti-
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tutions, perceived creditworthiness of a country). The coefficient λt are time fixed effects
which capture shocks affecting all countries such as the world interest rate. Specification
(46) does not contain time fixed effects precisely because we want to estimate the effect of
the federal funds rate which is a common shock across countries.
Finally to deal with all time-variant country-specific factors which can affect the share of
government debt held abroad I include Xit, a vector of controls. The vector X˜it of the
specification with no time fixed effects is the vector Xit augmented by a variable of collateral
constraints and a variable of fiscal capacity. In particular I include capital to asset ratio
and sovereign spread. Including other measures such as local credit or some measure of tax
revenues does not significantly change the coefficient for federal funds rate.
I include financial openness, percentage of public debt over GDP, and GDP real growth rate.
We expect a more financially open economy or an economy with higher debt to have more
sovereign debt held abroad regardless of collateral constraints and fiscal capacity. Also, a
growing economy is more likely to have sovereign debt held by internationals because these
expect a repayment more likely.
The regression equations also contain a measure of political risk and inflation. The political
risk index compiled by the International Country Risk Guide measures the degree of political
stability in a country (Comelli (2012)). A lower level of that index makes a country less
attractive to foreign investors. Also inflation makes sovereign debt less attractive to foreign
investors, since some of the debt is issued in local currency. More generally, inflation can be
seen by international investors as a signal of poor monetary and fiscal policy.
Furthermore, I include a measure of credit ratings residual which captures the effect of credit
ratings once we account for fundamentals and credit history. Good credit ratings will likely
increase the share of sovereign debt held by international investors.
Finally, since part of the sovereign debt is issued in local currency, I include the nominal
exchange rate to control for exchange rate risk. It is defined as local currency units per
US dollar. Everything else equal, an increase in the nominal exchange rate makes the
investment in LC debt less attractive for foreigners since the currency they are investing in
is depreciating. As we see in Appendix F.2 only two of the countries in my sample have hard
pegs as their exchange rate regimes over the whole period in my data and seven countries
have free floating exchange rate regimes. Therefore the nominal exchange rates do contain
information about exchange rate risk. For robustness I also use the annual change in the
nominal exchange rate instead of the level. For all specifications I obtain very similar results
and the variables that are significant with the level of the nominal exchange rate remain
significant at the same level of confidence too.
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Share of debt
abroad
Share of LC
abroad
Collateral constraints
(sH)
Capital to assets ratio - +
Local Credit + -
Fiscal capacity (η) Tax revenues measures + -
Sovereign debt spreads - +
International patience
(β∗)
Fed Funds Rate - +
Table 2: Summary of variables and expected signs for comparative statics
The three variables of special interest in these specifications are the measure of collateral
constraints, fiscal capacity, and federal funds rate. According to the model, β1 > 0 if we
use local credit as a measure of collateral constraints and β1 < 0 if we use banks’ capital
to assets ratio; β2 > 0 if we use the variables capturing tax revenues and β2 < 0 if we use
spreads, and β3 < 0. For convenience, the following table summarizes these expected signs
as well as the ones for the comparative statics on LC debt abroad.
The model predicts that a tightening of collateral constraints, lower local credit available
or a higher capital to assets in the banking sector, implies a repatriation of sovereign debt,
a lower share of debt held abroad. As we argued, bigger reinvestment needs increases the
domestic demand of sovereign debt for those who purchase debt as a way to store liquidity.
An increase in fiscal capacity increases the share of debt held abroad. This happens because
now each asset gives domestic investors now more return to cover reinvestment needs. This
decreases their demand, increasing the share of debt held by internationals.
Finally, an increase in the federal funds rate implies a decrease in the international discount
factor which brings about a decrease in the international demand for bonds.
The results are in Appendix F.3. Columns (1)-(5) contain the results for specification (45)
with different measures for tightening of collateral constraints and fiscal capacity. Column
(6) contains the results for specification (46). For all of them standard errors are clustered
at the country level using bootstrap.
The data confirms the predictions of the model regarding the importance of collateral con-
straints as captured by the inverse of the leverage ratio. This effect is negative and significant
in all except one specification. The results for local credit are inconclusive since the point
estimate is not significant.
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The evidence on fiscal capacity is not strong. The point estimates for the measures of tax
revenues are positive and the point estimate of the sovereign debt spread is negative, all as
predicted by the model, but these are only significant in one specification, column (2) when
using tax reveues over GDP.
Finally, the coefficient on the federal funds rate is also inconclusive. It is non-significant but
the point estimate contradicts the model since according to the model it had to be negative.
6.3 Comparative Statics on Local Currency Sovereign Debt Own-
ership
The specification used to test the comparative statics regarding ownership of relatively riskier
public debt instruments contained in Proposition 7 are the following:
%LC abroadit = αi + λt + βLC1 Collateralit + βLC2 Fiscal Capacityit + γXit + uit (47)
%LC abroadit = αi + βLC3 Federal Funds Ratet + γX˜it + uit (48)
where the dependent variable is the share of local currency public debt held abroad. As before
λt are time fixed effects and αi are country fixed effects which in this set-up could capture for
example the historical credibility in managing inflation. Xit is a vector of controls. As before,
X˜it is the same vector of controls but augmented with a measure of collateral constraints
and a measure of fiscal capacity. In particular here I use local credit and sovereign spread.
As before, including other measures such as capital to assets ratio or some measure of tax
revenues does not significantly change the coefficient for federal funds rate.
Most of the controls I included in (45) and (46) are included here. The channels through
which they may matter are similar to the ones explained previously. I make only one change:
substitute the share of public debt over GDP for the share of local currency debt over total
debt. For the share of LC debt held abroad the relevant stock variable is the total amount
of LC debt, as before we expect a country which issues more debt in LC to have more of it
held abroad.
We now concentrate on the relevant variables for Proposition 7. The model predicts that
βLC1 < 0 if we use local credit and βLC1 > 0 if we use banks capital to assets; βLC2 < 0 if we
use measures of tax revenues and βLC2 > 0 if we use spreads, and βLC3 > 0. These signs are
summarized in table 2.
Regarding the coefficient for local credit, the model with two assets predicts that as collateral
constraints become tighter at home the domestic demand for debt shifts towards the relatively
safer debt instruments. This increases the ratio of risky to safe foreign ownership, which is
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consistent with seeing increases in the foreign ownership of LC debt in the data. When
tightening of collateral constraints is measured as a decrease in local credit the sign of βLC1
is negative. If we measure tightening of collateral constraints as a decrease in the leverage
ratio, and hence an increase in the capital to assets ratio, we expect βLC1 > 0.
As we saw an increase in fiscal capacity implies a drop in the domestic demand of the safe
debt instrument, because each asset now gives a higher return for liquidity hoarding at home.
This implies an increase in the share of the safe instrument held abroad and a corresponding
decrease in the ratio risky to safe owned by internationals.
Finally, an increase in the international discount factor crowds-out the domestic demand for
safe asset. This causes a decrease in the share of risky to safe asset held abroad which is
consistent with a decrease in the LC debt held abroad.
The results are Appendix F.4. As before, columns (1)-(5) contain the results for specification
(47) and column (6) contains the result for equation (48). Standard errors are clustered at
the country level using bootstrap.
The results for collateral constraints confirm the predictions of the model. The coefficients
for local credit are negative and significant in all specifications as predicted by the model.
The coefficient for the inverse of the leverage ratio is non-significant.
The evidence for the effect of fiscal capacity on the share of LC public debt held abroad is
somewhat mixed. The coefficient for tax revenues over GDP confirms the prediction of the
model as we see in column (2). However this finding is not robust to including local credit as
a measure of collateral constraints. The other two measures of tax revenues are insignificant
and their point estimates are positive. As far as spreads are concerned, the point estimate
is positive as predicted by the model but it is not significant.
Finally, the data shows no evidence of a negative effect of the federal funds rate on the share
of LC debt held abroad. The coefficient is insignificant.
6.4 The Global Financial Crisis and Sovereign Debt Ownership
From the previous analysis, liquidity conditions emerge as key in determining foreign owner-
ship of sovereign debt. The global financial crisis offers a great setting to explore the effects
a tightening of liquidity conditions had on sovereign debt ownership.
To explore this, I sutdy how sovereign debt ownership correlate with measures of credit
conditions before and after the crisis. I mark the post period in the fourth quarter of 2008.
I choose this period because the third quarter of 2008 corresponds to the federal takeover of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and when the Federal Reserve cut its federal funds rate from
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Figure 3: Tightening of collateral constraints and sovereign debt foreign ownership (Data
sources: Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) and World Bank Indicators)
1.94% to 0.51%. We can see this as a quasi-exogenous tightening of collateral constraints for
the countries in my sample, since these were events happening in the US and with limited
repercussions in emerging markets at this time. However I cannot claim I am gauging at
causality since there could be many other relevant variables that I do not control for in this
analysis.
According to the benchmark model in section 2 more severe tightening of collateral conditions
causes a sovereign debt repatriation because domestics use sovereign debt as collateral. This
causes bigger drops in the share of sovereign debt held abroad. Figure 3 shows a scatter plot
for the 21 emerging economies in my sample. I plot the change in the share of sovereign debt
held abroad between 2008Q4 and 2007Q4 against the change in banks’ capital to assets ratio.
As expected we see a negative relationship between these two variables. Indeed countries
which experienced increases in capital to assets ratio in their banking sector experienced a
decrease in banks’ leveraging and thus a tightening of collateral constraints. According to
the model these countries should experience a drop in the share of government debt held
abroad.
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6.5 Discussion of Other Possible Channels
The results regarding the effect of the banking sector capital to assets ratio on sovereign
debt ownership is not driven by the automatic effect on banks balance sheets. In fact,
the automatic effect goes in the opposite direction. Sovereign debt repatriation increases
the assets’ of the banking sector because part of the debt is bought by banks (Arslanalp
and Tsuda (2014) for emerging economies and Arslanalp and Tsuda (2012) for advanced
economies). This automatically decreases the capital to assets ratio of the banking sector,
which would make us prone to find a negative instead of a positive association between the
share of debt held abroad and the banks’ capital to assets ratio. This goes against the results
presented in the previous subsections: I find a negative effect as predicted by the model even
though the effect on banks’ balance sheets goes in the direction of dampening this negative
association.
Broner et al. (2014) presents a model to explain similar stylized facts to the ones highlighted
in this paper: increases in the share of sovereign debt held by the domestic private sector as
sovereign spreads increased in some countries of the Euro Area, decreases in the share of debt
held abroad, shifts of domestic credit from the private to the public sector, and increases in
the borrowing costs for the private sector as sovereign spreads increased. In their model an
increase in the risk of default, caused by a decline in the quality of institutions or by changes
in investors’ expectations, increases the expected return for domestic investors of debt. This
happens because of their assumption of discrimination in favor of domestic creditors. In the
presence of financial frictions this increase in domestic demand for sovereign debt displaces
domestic investment.
The resulting connection between domestic demand for sovereign debt and investment is
also present in my model. However, the channels I present are somewhat different. In my
model there is no strategic sovereign default and thus no creditor discrimination in case of
sovereign default either. Instead, a worsening of financial conditions or a deterioration of
the government’s fiscal capacity, increases the domestic demand for sovereign debt. This
increased demand does not displace investment directly. The channels through which in-
vestment and thus welfare decrease are different in this model. A worsening of financial
conditions decreases the equity multiplier directly, and thus the extent to which the private
sector can leverage its own wealth. On the other hand, a deterioration of the government’s
fiscal capacity decreases the equity multiplier through its increase of the cost of liquidity
hoarding for the private sector.
The drop in investment in Broner et al. (2014) comes from a portfolio decision from the
private sector. An increase in the return of sovereign debt displaces other productive invest-
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ment. In my model the drop in investment comes from a worsening of financial conditions
or from an increase in the cost of liquidity hoarding for the private sector.
The key difference in the assumptions between both models is whether private sector in-
vestment and private sector purchases of sovereign debt are complements or substitutes. In
Broner et al. (2014) both are substitutes in the presence of financial frictions and more so
in what they call the “crowd-out region”. In models where sovereign debt acts as collateral,
both are complements. Example of this includes not only my paper but also among many
others Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Angeletos et al. (2012) and Gennaioli et al. (2014b).
Ultimately this is an empirical question and it is beyond the scope of this paper to distinguish
them.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a model where public debt has a liquidity role, debt is risky because
of government’s risky fiscal capacity and sovereign debt markets are integrated by different
investors who demand debt for different purposes. The paper shows that in this environ-
ment financial innovation in sovereign debt can increase domestic investment and domestic
welfare. The key assumption behind this result is the liquidity role of public debt. Financial
innovation can make liquidity cheaper for the private sector by changing the payoff structure
of the public assets in a way that lowers wasted liquidity for domestic investors.. For this
to be possible there must be other types of investors willing to hold the residual risk not
allocated to domestics.
The implementation of the optimal sovereign debt structure are assets of different relative
riskiness. The paradigm would be to have seniority clauses which render some bonds, senior
bonds, safe and riskier or junior bonds. Another possible implementation that I have explored
in the empirical analysis are local and foreign currency bonds.
The financial innovations proposed and the way of approaching the government’s financial
innovation problem have highlighted that the government can exploit the existence of dif-
ferent types of investors when designing assets. Especially the government can design assets
taking advantage of the different degrees of patience in its investor base and the different
rationales for holding public debt. The paper has shown that to provide liquidity optimally
at home the government does not need to segment markets or tax foreigners: an appropri-
ate asset design can result in market segmentation. The financial innovation problem has
also highlighted that when there are investors willing to hold riskier tranches of the public
fiscal capacity the government first allocates fiscal capacity to meet liquidity demands at
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home and after that allocates the residual riskier fiscal capacity to those investors willing to
hold it. Finally it has also highlighted the complementarities between financial innovation
and financial integration showing that the benefits of financial innovation are higher when
sovereign debt markets are more integrated.
The model presented in this paper has delivered comparative statics consistent with sizeable
shifts public debt ownership as a whole that has been reported extensively in the recent
years as well as shifts of relatively riskier debt instruments to foreigners. Moreover, data on
sovereign debt ownership and local currency public debt ownership for a group of emerg-
ing economies points at the important relationship between sovereign debt investor base
composition and tightness of collateral constraints in domestic markets.
The framework and results presented in this paper point to a number of promising avenues
for future research. Looking at investor base composition and debt ownership at a smaller
level of granularity regarding debt instruments and different types of investors. For instance,
thinking about shifts of ownership between financial and non-financial types of investors or
with different degrees of risk appetite. Introducing lack of commitment and allowing the
government to default on its public debt can introduce relevant trade-offs in the planner’s
financial innovation problem which have been ignored in this paper.
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A Financial Innovation in Sovereign Borrowing for Ad-
vanced Economies
Country Different
Maturities
Indexed to
Inflation
Variable rate/
coupon
Different
Currencies
Australia  
Austria 
Belgium  
Canada   1
Czech Republic 
Denmark   2
Finland  3
France  4 
Germany  
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy  5 
Japan   
Korea   6
Netherlands  7
New Zealand8  
Portugal 
Slovenia  9
Spain  10
Switzerland 
United Kingdom  
United States   
Source: Debt Management Offices of each country
1,3,6,7,9Foreign currency: US dollars. 2Foreign currency: euro. 4 Indexed to European and French Inflation.
5 Indexed to European and Italian Inflation. 8Other: kiwi bond (retail stock).
10It started issuing them in June 2014, after the first version of this paper was out.
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B Equilibrium characterization
First, we consider the case where η > (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) and β
∗ > 1 + λ(1+sL(1−λ)−sH)η(sH−ρ)(1−λ)Π .
When β∗ is higher than this upper bound it is too expensive for the entrepreneur to hoard
liquidity. Thus zL = 0 and the project cannot continue when s = sH , χ = 0. The initial
investment level is then given by
I = A1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ)
All public debt is held by foreigners, zF and their valuation pins down the price of public
debt q = β∗Π. As long as η > (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) international investors hold part of
the public debt and q = β∗Π. In the knife-edge case where β∗ = 1 + λ(1+sL(1−λ)−sH)η(sH−ρ)(1−λ)Π , the
continuation scale χ ∈ (0, 1) and investment scale equals:
I = A
1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − χλ(ρ − sH) + χ(sH − ρ)(β∗ − 1)(λ + (1 − λ) η¯η )
The domestic holdings of the public asset equal zL = χA(sH−ρ)
η
[
1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−χλ(ρ−sH)+χ(sH−ρ)(β∗−1)(λ+(1−λ) η¯η )
]
and international investors hold the rest zF = 1 − zL.
The last case to consider is the one where the return of the bond in s = sH is not big
enough, that is when η ≤ (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) . Under this parametric condition if also the
following condition on A holds
η(1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH))
sH − ρ < A <
η(1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH))
sH − ρ +
ηλ(1 + sL(1 − λ) − sH)
(1 − λ)(sH − ρ)
(49)
then the project is fully continued χ = 1, zL = 1 and zF = 0.
The demand for bonds is given by zL = I(sH−ρ)η . Combining this expression with (3) and
equating it to total supply of bonds we can solve the price of the bond in this equilibrium:
q = Π + A − η(1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH))
sH − ρ (50)
The constraints on A given in (49) ensures that the price of the public bond (50) satisfies
Π < q < qmax where qmax = Π + λ(1+sL(1−λ)−sH)η(sH−ρ)(1−λ) . Investment is given by:
I = η
sH − ρ (51)
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which as we see is increasing in η but not in the ratio of fiscal capacities as in the section 2.
It is increasing in η because when η is low the entrepreneur is constrained and cannot hoard
as much liquidity as she would want to. Therefore, the slacker this constraint is the higher
attainable investment will be.
Proposition 8. (a) An equilibrium in this model is given by a tuple (q, I, zL, zF ), consisting
on price of debt, initial investment scale and domestic and foreign holdings of the asset; (b)
when η > (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) and β
∗ < 1+ λ(1+sL(1−λ)−sH)η(sH−ρ)(1−λ)Π , then the equilibrium is given
by:
q = β∗Π
I = A
1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH) + (sH − ρ)(β∗ − 1)(λ + (1 − λ) η¯η )
zL = I(sH − ρ)
η
zF = 1 − zL
(c) When η > (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) and β
∗ = 1 + λ(1+sL(1−λ)−sH)η(sH−ρ)(1−λ)Π , then the equilibria is
given by for any χ ∈ (0, 1)
q = β∗Π
I = A
1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λχ(ρ − sH) + χ(sH − ρ)(β∗ − 1)(λ + (1 − λ) η¯η )
zL = χI(sH − ρ)
η
zF = 1 − zL
(d) When η > (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) and β
∗ > 1 + λ(1+sL(1−λ)−sH)η(sH−ρ)(1−λ)Π , then the equilibrium is
characterized by:
q = β∗Π
I = A1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ)
zL = 0 zF = 1
(e) When η ≤ (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) , then the equilibrium is as follows:
q = Π + A − η(1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH))
sH − ρ
I = η
sH − ρ
zL = 1 zF = 0
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C The Case of Capital Controls
As we have seen the equilibrium investment level with international investors given in (6) is
decreasing in the international investor´s patience. A natural question is whether imposing
capital controls which ban the arrival of international flows from abroad can increase welfare
at home.
A first approximation to this question would be to calculate the consumption of both types of
agents and compute domestic welfare as we discuss in section (3.2). Investment under open
financial markets is given by (6). Under autarky since (4) holds the marginal buyer of the
public bond is the domestic consumer which implies that the price of the bond has no liquidity
premium, q = Π and investment under autarky is simply given by I = A1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH) ,
since liquidity hoarding in autarky is costless. Thus, investment is higher under autarky.
However consumers lose from remaining in autarky since they now do not get the premia
coming from abroad, q − Π which due to the higher patience abroad will always be greater
than zero.
Now we allow for ex ante transfers between the entrepreneur and the consumer. The en-
trepreneur will transfer part of her initial wealth A to the consumer in order to make him
indifferent between autarky and open financial markets. Then we will compute whether the
final investment under autarky is higher than in open financial markets.
For convenience let´s denote by R¯ ≡ R−sL(1−λ)−sHλ−1, the net return from the domestic
investment and by k ≡ 1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − (ρ − sH)λ. As in the comparative statics part
we simplify notation by assuming η¯ = 1. Under open financial markets investment and the
transfer to consumers from abroad are given by:
IOpen = A
k + sH−ρ
η
(β∗ − 1)(λη + 1 − λ) (52)
TOpen = (β∗ − 1)(λη + 1 − λ)
(
1 − I
Open(sH − ρ)
η
)
(53)
For this to be an equilibrium (4) needs to hold, which we can rewrite in terms of the initial
wealth A being below a threshold:
A <
ηk
sH − ρ + (β
∗ − 1)(λη + 1 − λ)
Therefore let assume that the entrepreneur transfers TOpen to consumers. After this transfer
the consumer is indifferent between autarky and open financial markets. In autarky the
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entrepreneur’s investment choice after transfers is given by:
IAutarky,T = A˜
k
= A − T
Open
k
where the entrepreneur can leverage its initial wealth after transfers A˜ < A as much as 1/k
since in the closed economy when (4) holds the consumer is the marginal holder of the asset
who pins down the price. Thus, q = Π and there is no cost of hoarding liquidity for the
entrepreneur.
Proposition. Under autarky the consumer is made worse-off, the entrepreneur is made
better-off and total welfare is always smaller than under open financial markets. Open fi-
nancial markets is also better than autarky when the entrepreneur makes a transfer to the
consumer to make him indifferent between autarky and open financial markets.
Proof. For the first part, we need to calculate total welfare W = E+A+(R − sL(1 − λ) − sHλ − 1) I+
(q − Π)zF for both scenarios, open financial markets and autarky and show that WOpen >
WAutarky. Denote Π = (λη + 1 − λ).
Under open markets,
IOpen = A
k + sH−ρ
η
(β∗ − 1)Π
WOpen = E + A + R¯IOpen + (β∗ − 1)Π
(
1 − I
Open(sH − ρ)
η
)
where as we see WOpen welfare is comprised of the net return from investment and the
financial flows from abroad. For this to be an equilibrium it must be that
η >
(sH − ρ) (A − (1 − λ))
1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) + β∗λ(sH − ρ) (54)
Investment and welfare in the autarkic economy is given by:
IAutarky = A
k
WAutarky = E + A + R¯IAutarky
It follows directly from condition (54) that IAutarky > IOpen. For WOpen > WAutarky it must
be the case that
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R¯(IAutarky − IOpen) < (β∗ − 1)Π
(
1 − I
Open(sH − ρ)
η
)
(55)
Rearranging (55) we see that it always holds when IAutarky > IOpen, that is when(54) holds.
For the second part of the proposition we need to prove that IOpen − IAutarky,T > 0.
Substituting investment for their expressions we obtain that A
k+ sH −ρ
η
(β∗−1)Π −
A˜
k
> 0. Rear-
ranging this expression and substituting A˜ = A − TOpen we obtain (β∗ − 1)Π
(
η−IOpen
η
)
ηk >
−k(sH − ρ)(β∗ − 1)Π. Cancelling out terms this expression becomes η + sH − ρ > IOpen.
Using the expression for IOpen this is equivalent to A(ηk+ sH −ρη (β∗−1)Π)(η+sH−ρ)
< 1 which can
be rewritten as
A < ηk + k(sH − ρ) + (sH − ρ)(β∗ − 1)Π + (sH − ρ)
2(β∗ − 1)Π
η
This condition on A always holds when A < ηk
sH−ρ +(β
∗ − 1)Π , which is the initial condition
for an equilibrium given in section (C).
Capital controls which ban foreign investors from buying the public asset do not increase
welfare in this model because there are no pecuniary externalities. A crucial ingredient for
capital controls to be welfare-improving is that a relative price affects constrained individuals,
either directly by tightening collateral constraints or by decreasing wealth of constrained
individuals (Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004),
Aghion et al. (2001), Korinek (2011)).
From the entrepreneur’s problem (1) we see that this is not the case here. The price of the
public debt affects the investment choice level I and in turn how much of the public bond
available the entrepreneur demands but it does not affect how constrained the entrepreneur
is directly nor by changing the entrepreneur’s net worth.
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D Autarkic equilibria: Sovereign Debt Markets Closed
to Foreign Investors
In this section we derive the solution of the model in autarky. We start by analyzing the
case when (4) holds: η > (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) . In that case we know z
L coming from
domestic entrepreneurs is lower than total supply of public bond. With integrated sovereign
debt markets part of the bond would be held by foreign investors.
With sovereign debt markets only open to domestic agents, it will be consumers who will
demand the public bond. Since they do not have a liquidity motive to hold debt and their
discount factor β = 1 in equilibrium:
qAut,I = Π
When q = Π the entrepreneur is indifferent between holding as much bonds as to cover
liquidity needs and infinite: zL ∈ [ Iχ(sH−ρ)η ,∞). We assume that the entrepreneur just holds
enough to cover liquidity needs. Since q < qmax defined in appendix B, full continuation is
optimal in both states χ = 1 and liquidity needs are given by I(sH−ρ)η . Plugging this and the
price in the expression for investment (3) we obtain that the equilibrium level of investment
is:
IAut,I = A1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH)
Therefore the level of investment is increasing in the level of entrepreneur’s initial wealth
and in the equity multiplier 11−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)−λ(ρ−sH) which defines the maximum leverage per
unit of own capital that the entrepreneur can obtain. As in section 2 it is decreasing in the
expected cost of the project and increasing in the pledgeable return ρ.
However, under autarky when η is large enough, investment does not depend on the cost of
liquidity hoarding. This is due to the fact that when η is large enough the marginal holder
of the public bond is the domestic consumer who drives the liquidity premium to zero.
We now turn to the case when η ≤ (sH−ρ)(A−(1−λ)η¯)1−(ρ−sL)(1−λ)+β∗λ(sH−ρ) . In this case only the domestic
entrepreneur will hold the bond. The analysis here will be identical to the case with inte-
grated debt markets but η low derived in Appendix B. There we found that the price of the
bond is given by:
qAut,II = Π + A − η(1 − (ρ − sL)(1 − λ) − λ(ρ − sH))
sH − ρ
and that the level of equilibrium investment is increasing in η:
IAut,II = η
sH − ρ
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E Financial Innovation under Positive Correlation
This appendix presents the optimal financial innovation under the following assumption:
Assumption. 3’ The fiscal capacity shock and the private liquidity shock are positively cor-
related.
which substitutes Assumption 3 in section 2.
According to this new assumption there are four states of the world, s = {HL, HH, LL, LH}
with probabilities denoted as {λHL, λHH , λLL, λLH}. The first letter of each state denotes
the government’s fiscal capacity and the second denotes the liquidity shock. Thus, state HL
corresponds to the state where the government’s fiscal capacity is high and the private sector
does not need outside liquidity because the liquidity shock is small sL, and so on. To span
all the states of the world the government will issue four assets.
E.1 Financial Innovation without Monotonicity Constraints
As we saw in section 3.3 the optimal innovation is to issue Arrow-Debreu securities. These
securities must satisfy the fiscal capacity constraints. Labeling the assets from 1 to 4, this
implies that:
4∑
j=1
xjHL ≤ 1
4∑
j=1
xjHH ≤ 1
4∑
j=1
xjLL ≤ η
4∑
j=1
xjLH ≤ η
The assets will have the following payoffs: (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, η, 0) and finally
(0, 0, 0, η). The investor base composition of assets 1 and 3 will be only international in-
vestors for the same rationale as the main body of the paper: entrepreneurs do not want to
purchase an asset which gives a return when the liquidity shock is small, sL and prices are
q1 = β∗λHL and q3 = β∗λLL. The other two assets will be held by domestics and interna-
tionals and prices will be pinned down by international investors’ valuations: q2 = β∗λHH
and q4 = β∗λLH .
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1511
E.2 Financial Innovation under Monotonicity Constraints
Under imperfect correlation, monotonicity implies that each asset pays more when the gov-
ernment’s fiscal capacity is high. As in the main body of the paper the rationale for this
is that the state with lower fiscal capacity corresponds observationally to a sovereign debt
restructuring. This implies that:
xjHL ≥ xjLL
xjHH ≥ xjLH
xjHL ≥ xjLH
xjHH ≥ xjLL
where j denotes the asset. The optimal asset combination is a safe asset and two Arrow-
Debreu securities that satisfy the fiscal capacity constraints above: (1 − η, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1 −
η, 0, 0) and (η, η, η, η). The investor base for the risky assets will only be international
investors who will price the assets at q1 = β∗λHL(1 − η) and q2 = β∗λHH(1 − η). The safe
asset will be held by both types of investors and its price will be q3 = β∗η.
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F Appendix to the Empirical Analysis
F.1 Data Sources, Definitions, and Sample
Variable Description Source Range Frequency
Nonres Public debt held by
non-residents
over total outstanding debt (in
%)
Arslanalp and
Tsuda (2014)
2004-2010 Quarterly
Nonres LC Public local currency debt held
by non-residents over total
outstanding local currency debt
(in %)
Arslanalp and
Tsuda (2014)
2004-2010 Quarterly
Local Credit Private credit by deposit money
banks other institutions over
GDP (in %)
Beck et al. (2009) 2004-2010 Yearly
Capital to Assets Bank capital to bank assets
ratio (in %)
WB Indicators 2004-2010 Yearly
Fiscal Capacity Tax revenues over GDP (in %) WB Indicators 2004-2010 Yearly
Fiscal Capacity 2 Direct tax revenues on income,
profits, and capital gains as a %
of government revenues
WB Indicators 2004-2010 Yearly
Fiscal Capacity 3 Direct tax revenues on income,
profits, and capital gains as a %
of total tax revenues
WB Indicators 2004-2010 Yearly
Sovereign
spread
EMBI sovereign debt spread.
With respect to US with
similar maturity.
JP Morgan 2004-2010 Quarterly
Financial
Openness
Chinn-Ito Index Chinn and Ito
(2008)
2004-2010 Yearly
Political Risk Political Risk Index
(International Country Risk
Guide)
Cruces and
Trebesch (2013)
2004-2010 Quarterly
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Data Sources, Definitions, and Sample (continued)
Variable Description Source Range Frequency
CPI Inflation Consumer price inflation (yoy in
%)
WB Indicators 2004-2010 Yearly
Nominal
exchange rate
Official exchange rate (LCU per
US $, period average)
WB Indicators 2004-2010 Yearly
GDP Real
Growth
GDP real growth (yoy in %) WB Indicators 2004-2010 Yearly
Total Debt GDP Share of total public debt over
GDP (in %)
Arslanalp and
Tsuda (2014) and
WB Indicators
2004-2010 Yearly
LC Debt Share of local currency public
debt over total public debt (in
%)
Arslanalp and
Tsuda (2014)
2004-2010 Quarterly
Rating Residual Residual from regression of
ratings on fundamentals and
credit history
Cruces and
Trebesch (2013)
2004-2010 Quarterly
Fed Funds Effective federal funds rate Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis
2004-2010 Quarterly
* WB Indicators are World Bank Indicators
Groups of
countries
List of countries
Asia China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
Latin America Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay
EMEA-EU Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland
EMEA-Non EU Egypt, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine
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F.2 De facto Exchange Rate Regimes for Countries in Sample
2004-2010
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Argentina 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Brazil 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Chile 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
China 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Colombia 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Egypt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Hungary 1 1 1 1 3 3 3
Indonesia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mexico 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Malaysia 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Peru 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Philippines 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Poland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Russia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Thailand 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Turkey 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Uruguay 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
South Africa 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: IMF Exchange Rate classification in yearly reports
1 = denotes hard peg (exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender or currency board
arrangement), 2 = denotes soft peg (conventional peg agreement, stabilized arrangement,
crawling peg, pegged arrangement within horizontal bands), 3 = denotes free floating
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F.3 Share of Total Sovereign Debt held Abroad
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nonres nonres nonres nonres nonres nonres
Capital to Assets -1.365∗ -1.399∗ -1.442∗∗ -1.004 -0.961
(0.828) (0.713) (0.711)
Local Credit -0.0981
(0.108)
Tax Revenues/GDP 0.585 0.978∗
(0.509) (0.594)
Direct Taxes/Revenues 0.356
(0.293)
Direct Taxes/Tax Revenues 0.294
(0.269)
Sovereign Spread -0.00289 -0.00272∗
(0.00233) (0.00163)
Federal Funds Rate 0.203
(0.225)
Openness -1.240 0.0284 -0.106 0.0224 1.198 0.775
(1.146) (1.119) (1.621) (1.569) (2.156) (1.894)
Political stability 0.379 0.376 0.491∗∗ 0.500 0.0143 0.202
(0.269) (0.247) (0.246) (0.336) (0.345) (0.249)
GDP Real Growth 0.423 0.157 0.153 0.121 0.216 0.178
(0.296) (0.283) (0.284) (0.295) (0.274) (0.124)
CPI Inflation 0.266 -0.0461 -0.000873 0.0514 -0.0908 -0.224∗∗
(0.269) (0.213) (0.284) (0.233) (0.225) (0.111)
Rating Residual 0.249 -1.195 -1.450 -1.626 -1.597∗∗ -1.990∗∗
(1.078) (0.935) (1.109) (1.210) (0.785) (0.895)
Debt/GDP 0.208 0.240 0.279 0.274 0.199 0.255∗
(0.182) (0.183) (0.191) (0.180) (0.165) (0.142)
Nominal Exchange Rate 0.00768 0.00904 0.00698 0.00758 0.00630 0.00632
(0.1000) (0.0812) (0.109) (0.0256) (0.107) (0.101)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 408 456 456 456 501 501
No. Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
r2 0.394 0.378 0.381 0.387 0.336 0.269
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level using bootstrap
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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F.4 Share of Local Currency Public Debt held Abroad
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nonres_LC nonres_LC nonres_LC nonres_LC nonres_LC nonres_LC
Capital to Assets -0.805
(1.298)
Local Credit -0.331∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗
(0.0996) (0.135) (0.124) (0.0975) (0.0736)
Tax Revenues/GDP -0.911 -1.732∗∗
(1.008) (0.750)
Direct Tax/Revenues 0.234
(0.272)
Direct Taxes/Tax Revenues 0.200
(0.418)
Sovereign Spread 0.00281 0.00280
(0.00533) (0.00475)
Federal Funds Rate 0.376
(0.502)
Openness -0.343 -0.406 -0.0802 0.0491 2.624 2.080
(2.184) (1.718) (1.157) (1.507) (2.301) (2.187)
Political Stability 0.271 0.143 0.395 0.388 0.105 -0.314
(0.335) (0.406) (0.376) (0.359) (0.343) (0.390)
GDP Real Growth 0.265 0.531∗ 0.180 0.201 0.464∗ 0.392
(0.325) (0.287) (0.238) (0.370) (0.252) (0.297)
CPI Inflation -0.773∗ -0.602 -0.739∗ -0.719∗∗ -0.328 -0.337∗∗
(0.466) (0.497) (0.397) (0.340) (0.308) (0.162)
Rating Residual 1.183 0.215 1.130 1.032 1.391 2.543∗∗∗
(1.528) (1.818) (1.474) (1.547) (1.122) (0.974)
LC Debt/Total Debt -0.106 -0.0794 -0.0878 -0.0814 -0.0950 0.0674
(0.220) (0.169) (0.154) (0.236) (0.184) (0.119)
Nominal Exchange Rate -0.00355 0.000118 -0.00491 -0.00450 -0.00145 -0.00227
(0.291) (0.317) (0.109) (0.295) (0.0994) (0.0785)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Obs. 339 363 339 339 368 368
No. Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
R-Squared 0.467 0.327 0.461 0.463 0.342 0.219
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level using bootstrap
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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